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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many readers—especially lawyers—first learned the facts of 
Maples v. Thomas1 from an article published in 2010 in the New York 
Times.2 On death row in Alabama, Cory Maples sought post-
conviction relief in state court,3 represented pro bono by two 
associate attorneys at the prominent law firm Sullivan & Cromwell. 
When the trial court denied Maples’s petition, it sent notice to the two 
associates at the firm’s street address, which started a forty-two day 
period for filing a timely appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals. But by that time, and unbeknownst either to Maples or the 
court, the associates had left the firm. Instead of forwarding the 
notices on to them, or redirecting the notices to other attorneys within 
 
 David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I submitted a brief as 
amica curiae on behalf of the petitioner in Maples that drew on my knowledge of agency law 
based on my service as the Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006). I am 
grateful to my colleague, Walter Dellinger, and his team at O’Melveny & Myers LLP for serving 
as my counsel on the brief. 
 1.  132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 2.  See Adam Liptak, A Mailroom Mix-Up That Could Cost a Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03bar.html?_r=0 (providing a brief summary of the 
situation that led Cory Maples to miss the deadline for filling his appeal). 
 3.  Maples sought post-conviction relief in Alabama state court and subsequently in 
federal court in his petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that he was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. Maples, 132 S. Ct. 
at 919. In particular, he alleged “that his inexperienced and underfunded attorneys failed to 
develop and raise an obvious intoxication defense” to the two murder charges of which he was 
convicted. Id. Trial counsel also allegedly failed to “object to several egregious instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and [were] woefully underprepared for the penalty phase of his trial.” 
Id. Perhaps to place these allegations in a broader context, the Court’s majority opinion opens 
with an overview of Alabama practices applicable to indigent defendants—like Maples—in 
capital cases. Id. at 917–18. Eligibility requirements for counsel are low, as is compensation. Id. 
This comment does not explore the issues raised by Maples’s allegations in his habeas petition. 
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the firm, mail room personnel stamped the envelopes that contained 
the notices “Return to Sender,” and sent them back to the trial-court 
clerk in Alabama.4 The clerk took no further action when the notices 
reappeared; local counsel for Maples, who received the notice, did not 
act on it. Once forty-two days had elapsed, Maples not only lost the 
right to appeal within the Alabama court system, but also, the State 
later argued, was chargeable with a procedural default that barred his 
ability to seek habeas corpus relief in federal court.5 The federal 
district court6 and the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the State.7 The 
Supreme Court reversed.8 
Maples v. Thomas is the Court’s first explicit recognition that 
abandonment by counsel can suffice to excuse a procedural default in 
the context of a petition for habeas corpus. The Court’s early-2012 
opinions in Maples are significant for several reasons, three of which I 
discuss in this brief comment. First, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a 
seven-to-two majority holds that abandonment by counsel constitutes 
cause to excuse a procedural default when the client has no notice 
that he effectively lacks representation by counsel at the relevant 
time.9 A procedural default under such circumstances is not 
attributable to the client because it occurred through no fault of the 
client.10 The majority opinion also ventures a generalized formulation 
of how “abandonment” might be defined and how a petitioner might 
show its occurrence.11 
Second, beyond its technical contribution to the law addressing 
post-conviction relief, Maples invites reflection on large law firms, the 
organization of work within them, the inevitable hand-offs of 
responsibility that occur when lawyers leave firms, and the 
 
 4.  Thus, colloquially, Maples is the “Return to Sender” case, also the title of a song 
written by Winfield Scott and Otis Blackwell and recorded as a single by Elvis Presley in 1962. 
ELVIS PRESLEY, Return to Sender, on GIRLS! GIRLS! GIRLS! (Elvis Presley Music 1962). To see 
Elvis performing the song, see fairytaledreamerx, Elvis Presley—Return to Sender, YOUTUBE 
(Jan. 9, 2008), www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z54-QHEZN6E. 
 5.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 921. 
 6.  Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879, 885 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. 
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 7.  Id. at 890. 
 8.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 912. 
 9.  Id. at 927. 
 10.  See id. Six Justices joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion; Justice Alito wrote a separate 
concurrence but also concurred in the majority opinion; Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion 
joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 916. 
 11.  See id. at 923 (exploring when “abandonment” has occurred, as opposed to simple 
“attorney error”). 
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responsibility of individual lawyers who are members of teams. 
Although this brief comment is not the occasion to give this 
dimension of Maples its full due, the case is a useful vehicle for 
considering how the same organizational complexities that enable 
teams of lawyers to undertake sophisticated matters may also enable 
serious errors to go undetected. 
Third, and most broadly, Maples affords an occasion to reconsider 
the extent to which it is fair to charge clients with the consequences of 
errors made by their lawyers.12 So long as a lawyer had authority to 
act on the client’s behalf, the client is ordinarily bound by her lawyer’s 
actions—even when the client is unaware of the error.13 As Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion points out, the majority’s opinion requires 
drawing a fine line between ordinary ineffectiveness of counsel and 
ineffectiveness that demonstrates “he was not a genuinely 
representative agent.”14 However, to draw such distinctions is 
consistent with basic principles of agency law, which operate less 
mechanically than many believe. Moreover, perhaps doctrines 
external to agency law itself could usefully be applied in some specific 
settings, including post-conviction proceedings, in which the stakes are 
high for the client and many circumstances may undermine the 
quality of legal representation. 
II. MAPLES AND EXCUSES FOR PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
A. Agency Law’s Implications for Post-Conviction Relief 
The specific doctrinal question addressed in Maples requires some 
initial framing. In Maples and other cases in which lawyers erred in 
seeking post-conviction relief for imprisoned clients, analysis begins 
by acknowledging the absence of a constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in the post-conviction context.15 When a 
defendant has this right, the state, and not the client, is chargeable 
 
 12.  See Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for Their Lawyers’ 
Mistakes?, 110 MICH. L. REV. 875, 878–84 (2012) [hereinafter Liptak, Agency and Equity] 
(discussing the facts of Maples v. Thomas after asking, “why not?” to the question of whether 
clients should be notified of an impending dismissal). 
 13.  For the general point that lawyers are treated as their client’s agents, see Deborah A. 
DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301 (1998). 
 14.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 933. 
 15.  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 
(1969). 
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with lawyer errors that amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.16 
Thus, when the client has a right to receive effective assistance of 
counsel, the lawyer’s error is deemed to be external to the client. 
Separately, a prisoner convicted in state court may not pursue 
habeas corpus relief in federal court when a state court has declined 
to address the prisoner’s claims because he “failed to meet a state 
procedural requirement” and “the state judgment rests on 
independent and adequate state procedural grounds.”17 In contrast, a 
state-level procedural default does not bar federal review when a 
prisoner can show “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice” as a 
result of the violation of federal law alleged in the habeas petition.18 
Such cause is constituted by the occurrence of “something external to 
the petitioner . . . that cannot fairly be attributed to him” and that 
“impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”19 
However, ordinary negligence by the petitioner’s counsel is not 
“external to the petitioner” and thus does not constitute “cause” for 
this purpose. The Court reasoned in Coleman v. Thompson20 that, as 
the principal in an agency relationship with his counsel, the petitioner 
bore the risk of his agent’s negligence.21 Put differently, negligence on 
the part of the petitioner’s lawyer is not defined as “external” to the 
petitioner because the petitioner is charged with it, just as any 
principal is charged with the conduct of an agent acting within the 
agent’s scope of actual or apparent authority. An agent’s negligent 
conduct that inflicts loss on the principal breaches the agent’s duties 
to the principal, giving the principal a claim against the agent to be 
indemnified against the loss.22 Those consequences are internal to the 
 
 16.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17.  Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991)). Whether the Alabama judgment rested on such an “adequate and 
independent ground” was raised by Maples in his petition for certiorari. See Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 2, Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (No. 10-63). The Court did not grant certiorari on that 
question. See Maples v. Thomas, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011) (granting certiorari limited to Question 
2). Question 2 asked, “[w]hether the Eleventh Circuit properly held . . . that there was no ‘cause’ 
to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the State’s own 
conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner’s attorneys of record were no longer 
functioning as his agents at the time of any default.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, 
Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (No. 10-63). 
 18.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749–50 (1991). 
 19.  Id. at 753 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). 
 20.  501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 21.  Id. at 753–54. 
 22.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006). 
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principal-agent relationship and, at least usually,23 they do not impair 
the legal consequences for the principal vis-à-vis third parties that 
stem from the agent’s conduct. However, Coleman also recognized 
that the agency relationship between them is severed once a lawyer 
withdraws from representing a client, and the lawyer’s subsequent 
actions are not fairly attributable to the client.24 This leaves the 
question of whether (or when) a lawyer’s breaches of duty to the 
client in an ongoing lawyer-client relationship effectively sever the 
relationship and might constitute cause. Does Coleman require 
judicial indifference to the character, quality, gravity, or consequences 
of a lawyer’s breach of duty? 
Maples was not the Court’s first encounter with these questions. 
Two years before its opinion in Maples, the Court considered possible 
distinctions among lawyers’ breaches of duty in Holland v. Florida.25 
In Holland, the petitioner missed the one-year deadline for filing a 
federal habeas petition prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).26 The Court 
held that the statutory time limit could be tolled for equitable reasons 
and that a lawyer’s unprofessional conduct could be treated as an 
extraordinary circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling. 
 
 23.  But see infra text accompanying notes 101–105 (noting that agent’s serious disloyalty 
may terminate agency relationship or defeat imputation of agent’s knowledge to principal). 
 24.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. 
 25.  130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 
 26.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a one-year limitation period applies to “an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 
The one-year period runs from the latest of: 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review of 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the 
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D) 
(West 2012) [hereinafter AEDPA]. This subsection was added to section 2244 by Title I of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). In 
Holland, the petitioner’s lawyer erroneously believed that the one-year period imposed by 
AEDPA was tolled during the pendency of petitions for discretionary appellate review, such as 
petitions for certiorari. 130 S. Ct. at 2558. The petitioner, in contrast, understood the law 
correctly. Id. at 2557. But a lawyer’s erroneous understanding of the law is only negligence 
(whether ordinary or gross negligence) which does not excuse a procedural default. See id. at 
2563 (instructing that “in the context of procedural default, without qualification, that a 
petitioner ‘must bear the risk of attorney error’” (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–53)). Thus, it 
was crucial that petitioner emphasize abandonment by counsel, not counsel’s error. 
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Important to the analysis (and outcome) in Holland was the 
petitioner’s emphasis on challenging his lawyer’s conduct, not as 
negligence, but as abandonment.27 As Maples characterizes the 
lawyer’s conduct in Holland, he “detached himself from any trust 
relationship with his client.”28 In particular, the lawyer in Holland did 
not communicate with his client for an extended period of time, did 
not inform him when the state court ruled against him, and did not 
file the necessary documents in time for his client to seek review in 
federal court. When the client wrote directly to the Florida Supreme 
Court to convey his complaints and request a new lawyer, prosecutors 
objected (and the Florida court agreed) that the client could not 
contact the court directly because he was represented by counsel.29 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Holland, which characterizes 
as “perverse”30 the State’s opposition to the petitioner’s request for 
new counsel, also articulates an analytic structure to differentiate 
between ordinary negligence and lawyer misconduct that constitutes 
“extraordinary circumstances” excusing procedural default.31 Error, 
however egregious, is not tantamount to abandonment because it 
does not sever the relationship between lawyer and client.32 In 
contrast, “[c]ommon sense dictates that a litigant cannot be held 
constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not 
operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.”33 
Adopting this distinction, Maples holds that a client, under agency 
principles, is not charged with the consequences of a lawyer’s conduct 
when the lawyer has abandoned the client. By severing the agency 
relationship, abandonment obviates the basis on which the client as 
principal is charged with the consequences of the lawyer’s conduct. 
Additionally, a client cannot “be faulted for failing to act on his own 
behalf when he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, 
are not representing him.”34 This basis for excusing procedural default 
requires that the client have been unaware and thus unable to protest 
 
 27.  See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555 (referring to Holland’s claims that his attorney 
“abandoned” him). 
 28.  Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012). 
 29.  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 30.  Id. at 2568. 
 31.  Id. at 2567. 
 32.  See, e.g., id. (“[T]he error of an attorney is constructively attributable to the client . . . 
regardless whether the attorney error in question involves ordinary or gross negligence.”). 
 33.  Id. at 2568. 
 34.  Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012). 
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or otherwise seek assistance, as did the very aware petitioner in 
Holland. Additionally, the client must be unaware of conduct or 
inaction that is sufficiently grievous to terminate an agency 
relationship, such that the client is, as a factual matter, not represented 
by a lawyer whose name remains associated with the case. 
B. More of the Maples Narrative 
To understand how this distinction might apply, it is helpful to 
consider more of the factual specifics of Maples itself, in particular the 
conduct of the two erstwhile associates at Sullivan & Cromwell, the 
firm itself and other personnel of the firm, and Maples’s local counsel 
in Alabama. All members of the Maples Court agreed that the two 
associates abandoned their client.35 They left the firm without giving 
notice to their client or the court and without seeing to the 
appointment of substitute counsel.36 Additionally, both undertook new 
employment subject to terms that would not permit their ongoing 
representation of a private client like Maples: one became a law clerk 
to a federal judge, the other an employee of the European 
Commission.37 Within the terminology of agency law, through their 
conduct they renounced their roles as counsel to Maples.38 Their 
renunciations terminated their authority to act on his behalf.39 
Additionally, treating their conduct as a form of de facto withdrawal 
from representing Maples, the associates disregarded Alabama law, 
which requires leave from the court to withdraw.40 
In the majority’s assessment, the record is “cloudy” on the roles 
that other lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell served in connection with 
the Maples case.41 Following the associates’ departure, no other lawyer 
at Sullivan & Cromwell sought to be admitted pro hac vice to the 
Alabama bar and, apparently, no lawyer at the firm associated with 
Maples’s case was generally admitted to law practice in Alabama.42 No 
 
 35.  Id. at 927 (“[M]aples was trapped when counsel of record abandoned him without a 
word of warning.”); id. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I agree that petitioner’s attorneys 
effectively abandoned him . . . .”); id. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I likewise agree with the 
Court’s conclusion that Maples’ two out-of-state attorneys of record . . . had abandoned 
Maples . . . .”). 
 36.  Id. at 919 (majority opinion). 
 37.  Id. at 924. 
 38.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 119 cmt. b (1958). 
 39.  Id. § 118. 
 40.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919. 
 41.  Id. at 925. 
 42.  Id. at 919. 
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one from the firm contacted the court, and, as a result, the two 
associates remained listed as Maples’s attorneys of record, along with 
local counsel.43 In an affidavit submitted to the Alabama court once 
the default (and debacle) materialized, a partner at the firm stated 
that he had been “involved” in the case since the time of the petition 
to the trial court seeking post-conviction relief.44 The partner’s 
affidavit also stated that he and other lawyers prepared for an 
evidentiary hearing after the trial court denied a motion from the 
State to dismiss the petition.45 A separate affidavit from another 
associate at the firm stated that she, too, had worked on the case.46 
Neither affidavit detailed the nature of the work done and, 
interestingly, the same partner also stated by affidavit that the 
practice at Sullivan & Cromwell was that “lawyers ‘handle pro bono 
cases on an individual basis’” and do not use the firm name on 
correspondence or court papers in connection with pro bono 
representations.47 
Murky though this history may be, it is clear that filing a notice of 
appeal on behalf of Maples required that a lawyer be admitted—at 
least pro hac vice—to practice law in Alabama, enter an appearance 
on Maples’s behalf, and inform the court that he or she should be 
substituted for the now-departed associates as counsel of record.48 It is 
also clear that no lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell took any of these 
steps in the forty-two days during which the trial court’s denial of 
post-conviction relief could have been appealed.49 Thus, the majority 
in Maples concludes, no lawyer still at Sullivan & Cromwell was, at 
that time, Maples’s authorized agent because none had the 
qualification, or had satisfied the conditions, required to take legal 
action on his behalf in compliance with Alabama law.50 As all of this 
happened unbeknownst to Maples, he lacked reason to know that he 
was no longer represented by any lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell.51 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 925. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 931 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This practice may not be typical among large law 
firms. It would, for example, lead one to wonder how the firm would identify and address 
conflicts between potential pro bono clients of individual lawyers and clients of the firm. 
 48.  Id. at 919 (majority opinion). 
 49.  Id. at 925–26. 
 50.  Id. at 926. 
 51.  Id. at 927 (“[Maples] had no reason to suspect that, in reality, he had been reduced to 
pro se status.”). Analyzed in an agency-law framework, no lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell at 
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He also had no right to receive notice himself from the trial court 
because, on the record, he remained represented by counsel.52 Thus, as 
Justice Ginsburg observed, Maples was “abandoned . . . without a 
word of warning” that he lacked effective representation, and left 
unaware that he proceeded pro se.53 
An implicit element of disagreement between the Maples majority 
and the dissenters is how to define “representation.” To the majority, 
as discussed above, a client is unrepresented for purposes of excusing 
a procedural default when the client lacks notice that no lawyer 
involved with the client’s case has the legal capacity to take action on 
the client’s behalf that would be requisite to avoid the default.54 This 
definition turns on the agency concept of actual authority (here, to 
represent Maples before Alabama courts) as opposed to the broader 
range of circumstances under which a lawyer may owe duties to a 
particular person as a client.55 In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent 
argues that other lawyers at the firm who worked on Maples’s case 
also represented him on an individual basis, and thus owed him duties 
that included keeping him informed about the case and pertinent 
deadlines.56 And presumably any of those lawyers could have 
informed the court, entered an appearance, and obtained the right to 
represent Maples pro hac vice. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, 
Maples was poorly represented but not unrepresented at the time he 
could have appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief. However, this argument overlooks the fact that no 
one in this larger, but ill-defined, cast of lawyers could legally have 
 
that time had authority to act on Maples’s behalf because it would have been illegal for any 
lawyer there to take the requisite action. Id. at 926 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 111 (1958) (an agent’s “failure to acquire a qualification . . . without which it is illegal 
to do an authorized act” terminates the agency relationship)); id. at 924–25 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 111 cmt. b (the ordinary inference is “that a principal 
does not intend an agent to do an illegal act”)). 
 52.  Id. at 927. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Nothing in the Maples majority opinion suggests that a client aware that his lawyer 
does not effectively represent him, as in Holland, would be precluded from establishing grounds 
to excuse a procedural default. 
 55.  Standard accounts of lawyer-client relationships differentiate between the formation of 
a lawyer-client relationship, which imposes duties on the lawyer to the client, and a lawyer’s 
authority to take action on a client’s behalf. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS §14 (2000) (stating circumstances under which a lawyer-client 
relationship is formed); id. § 26 (stating when a lawyer has actual authority to act on a client’s 
behalf); id. § 27 (stating when a lawyer’s act is considered to be that of the client based on the 
lawyer’s apparent authority). 
 56.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 931–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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taken the action Maples needed, which was to file a notice of appeal 
on his behalf in an Alabama court. Indeed, the notice itself is a short 
and simple document,57 but unaware of his lack of representation, 
Maples had no reason to know that he needed to file the notice 
himself, or find other counsel able to act on his behalf before 
Alabama courts. 
As noted in the Introduction, Maples was also represented by 
local counsel, as required at the time by Alabama law when out-of-
state counsel sought pro hac vice admission to practice before an 
Alabama court, regardless of the nature of the proceeding or client.58 
In the majority’s assessment, local counsel “did not even begin” to 
represent Maples because he told the two Sullivan & Cromwell 
associates that his role would be limited to enabling them to appear 
pro hac vice.59 To limit his representation in this manner was 
inconsistent with Alabama law.60 But it was consistent with local 
counsel’s pattern of sustained inactivity, which extended to his receipt 
of the notice from the trial court. This prompted no action on his part, 
such as contacting Sullivan & Cromwell.61 Tellingly, the State itself 
appeared at the time to recognize that local counsel’s role had been 
limited and had terminated. Once the time to appeal the trial court’s 
denial of relief expired, the assistant attorney general who 
represented the State in Maples’s post-conviction proceedings sent a 
letter directly to Maples himself in prison (with no copies to any of his 
three attorneys of record), notifying him that the deadline to appeal 
within the Alabama system had expired, but also informing him that 
 
 57.  Id. at 927 n.11 (majority opinion) (stating that the “notice is a simple document” that 
“need specify only: the party taking the appeal, the order or judgment appealed from, and the 
name of the court to which appeal is taken” (citing ALA. R. APP. P. 3(c))). 
 58.  In 2006, Alabama revised the relevant rule, Rule Governing Admission to the Ala. 
State Bar VII. As amended, Rule VII does not require that out-of-state counsel associate with 
local counsel when out-of-state counsel seeks to represent, on a pro bono basis, an indigent 
criminal defendant in post-conviction proceedings. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919 n.3. The majority 
opinion in Maples points out that Alabama is “[n]early alone among the states” in not 
“guarantee[ing] representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings.” 
Id. at 918. 
 59.  Id. at 926. 
 60.  Id. In particular, the applicable rule required that local counsel “accept joint and 
several responsibility with the foreign attorney to the client, opposing parties, and counsel, and 
to the court or administrative agency in all matters.” Id. at 919 (quoting Rule Governing 
Admission to Ala. State Bar VII (2000)). More generally, restrictions on the scope of a lawyer’s 
representation of a client require the client’s agreement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19(1). Agreed-to restrictions are not effective unless the client is 
“informed of any significant problems a limitation might entail” and consents. Id. cmt. c. 
 61.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 926. 
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four weeks remained during which he could file a federal habeas 
petition.62 The State’s lawyer at least believed that Maples was no 
longer represented by counsel, given any lawyer’s ethical obligation to 
direct communications to the lawyer known to represent an opposing 
party.63 
In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion emphasizes that 
“[w]hat matters . . . is not whether the prosecutor thought Maples had 
been abandoned, but whether Maples really was abandoned,”64 
pointing to local counsel’s “[a]lmost immediate[]” flurry of activity 
once the prior default came to light.65 Whether or not the scope of 
local counsel’s authority revived or expanded after the default, it was 
defunct or in abeyance prior to the default.66 Moreover, the fact that 
the State’s lawyer contacted Maples directly is best explained as 
consistent with a belief, grounded in experience with the case to date, 
that no lawyer then represented Maples. This episode prompted 
several questions at oral argument directed to Alabama’s Solicitor 
General. Asked Chief Justice Roberts, followed by laughter in the 
 
 62.  Id. at 920. Maples then contacted his mother, who called Sullivan & Cromwell, 
whereupon three other lawyers at the firm made a motion in the Alabama trial court seeking a 
re-issue of the court’s order, which would begin a new forty-two-day period for appeal. Id. The 
trial court denied the motion, noting that the two former associates remained counsel of record, 
never having withdrawn. Id. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied a petition for a 
writ of mandamus; the Alabama Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Id. at 921. 
 63.  Id. at 926. 
 64.  Id. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Within the taxonomy of agency law, one might characterize local counsel as a 
subagent, chosen by Maples’s agents (the associates at Sullivan & Cromwell) to fulfill a limited 
objective, which was to obtain their pro hac vice admission in Alabama. His authority 
terminated when that limited objective was accomplished. A subagent is defined as “a person 
appointed by an agent to perform functions that the agent has consented to perform on behalf 
of the agent’s principal and for whose conduct the appointing agent is responsible to the 
principal.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) (2006). See id. cmt. e for a discussion 
on the termination of a subagent’s authority. Separately, local counsel’s authority would 
terminate upon termination of the authority of his appointing agents, the associates who needed 
pro hac vice admission to practice in Alabama. See id. Their authority terminated when they 
abandoned Maples. See id. (subagent’s authority terminates upon notice, inter alia, that the 
relationship between agent and principal has been terminated). Local counsel had “notice” of 
the termination, as agency doctrine defines the term, because he has “notice” of a fact when he 
“knows the fact, has reason to know it, has received an effective notification of the fact, or 
should know the fact to fulfill a duty owed to another person.” Id. § 5.01(3). To fulfill any 
ongoing duty to Maples, local counsel should have known that he had been abandoned by his 
other attorneys of record. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 
469 (N. St. John Green rev. ed., 8th ed. 1874) (1839) (explaining that subagency is automatically 
terminated upon severance of the primary agency relationship because the subagency is a 
“dependent power” and because termination “is a natural result from the presumed intention of 
the principal”). 
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courtroom: “Why did he do it? Why did he do it then? Just gloating 
that— that the fellow had lost?”67 And: “What was the point of it? He 
must have thought there was a problem, right,” the Chief Justice 
continued.68 Replied Alabama’s Solicitor General, “Your Honor, he 
certainly was aware that Mr. Maples’s lawyers had failed to file a 
notice of appeal. But— and his letter reveals that he is very aware—” 
at which point other Justices intervened with other questions.69 
Finally, once the missed deadline came to light, lawyers then at 
Sullivan & Cromwell did take action on Maples’s behalf, first in 
Alabama courts, up through briefing and oral argument in the 
Eleventh Circuit.70 However, once the deadline was missed, further 
work by the firm was shadowed by a conflict of interest because, as 
the Maples majority explains, “the firm’s interest in avoiding damage 
to its own reputation was at odds with Maples’ strongest argument,” 
his prior abandonment by the firm’s former associates and the firm’s 
failure to respond appropriately and in a timely fashion to the 
associates’ departure.71 Instead, before the Eleventh Circuit, the firm 
“attempted to cast responsibility for the mishap on the clerk of the 
Alabama trial court.”72 To be sure, the clerk’s failure to respond more 
affirmatively when the notices marked “Return to Sender” appeared 
in the mail could be problematic. One might question whether the 
clerk, and the State via the clerk’s knowledge, had notice that 
Maples’s counsel of record no longer represented him, as well as 
whether the clerk had a duty to respond in some fashion.73 But those 
questions are harder to answer than the questions raised by the 
conduct of Maples’s lawyers. 
C. Maples and Botched Transitions of Responsibility within Large 
Law Firms 
Justice Alito’s separate concurring opinion characterizes what 
happened to Maples as “not a predictable consequence of the 
Alabama system but a veritable perfect storm of misfortune, a most 
unlikely combination of events . . . .”74 Several media accounts of the 
 
 67.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 34–35. 
 70.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 925 n.8. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See infra text accompanying notes 106–110. 
 74.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 929 (Alito, J., concurring). In contrast, the majority opinion 
DEMOTT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012  1:48 PM 
2012] ABANDONED . . . WITHOUT A WORD OF WARNING 51 
Court’s resolution of Maples quoted the “perfect storm” language,75 
which is prefaced in Justice Alito’s opinion by a list of eight salient 
factors that contributed to the default.76 Apart from its technical 
implications for post-conviction relief, Maples is also a concrete 
illustration of the potential for error when individuals within large 
and complex organizations—here, a well-regarded law firm—share 
responsibility for work they have undertaken, but specific individuals 
leave the organization. This potential for cumulative multi-causal 
error surely rings true for many lawyers, regardless of the nature of 
their practice. 
Two of the causal factors identified by Justice Alito implicate not 
the specific actions that a lawyer could be authorized to take on 
behalf of a client, but the functioning of a large organization. Thus, in 
the midst of the opinion’s articulation of eight factors occurring over 
time that led to Maples’s predicament falls “(5) the apparent failure 
of the firm . . . to monitor the status of petitioner’s case” once the 
former associates left the firm.77 Indeed, partners in law firms and 
supervisory lawyers more generally have a duty to “make reasonable 
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform” to rules of 
professional conduct,78 which include a duty to “act with reasonable 
 
begins with systemic information about the representation of indigent defendants in capital 
cases in Alabama courts. See id. at 917–18 (majority opinion); discussion supra note 3. One 
scholar characterizes “perfect storm” as a metaphor that, when used in judicial opinions, “offers 
a complete explanation of the consequences of the storm in a way that absolves the human actor 
of all blame.” Carol McCrehan Parker, The Perfect Storm, the Perfect Culprit: How a Metaphor 
of Fate Figures in Judicial Opinions, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 323, 333 (2012). In the context of 
his concurring opinion in Maples, Justice Alito’s use of “perfect storm” seems not to absolve 
human actors from blame but to differentiate his explanation from an inference to be drawn 
from the majority opinion’s discussion of aggregate characteristics related to representation of 
indigent defendants in capital cases in Alabama. Specifically, Justice Alito observes that, “I do 
not think that Alabama’s system had much if anything to do with petitioner’s misfortune.” 
Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring). Moreover, “a similar combination of untoward 
events could have occurred if petitioner had been represented by Alabama attorneys who were 
appointed by the court and paid for with state funds.” Id. This is not an argument that the 
“combination of untoward events” in any way exculpated the lawyers who actually or 
hypothetically represented Maples. 
 75.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Inmate After Mailroom Mix-Up, N.Y. TIMES 
Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/cory-r-maples-must-be-given-second-
chance-after-mailroom-mix-up-justices-rule.html; Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Rules 
for Death-Row Inmate Whose BigLaw Lawyers Missed the Appeal Deadline, 
ABAJOURNAL.COM, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www-source.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
supreme_court_allows_appeal_for_death-row_inmate_whose_biglaw_lawyers_misse. 
 76.  132 S. Ct. at 928–29 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 77.  Id. at 928. 
 78.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2011). 
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diligence and promptness in representing a client.”79 And all lawyers 
must, upon terminating their representation of a client, “take steps to 
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as 
giving reasonable notice to the client [and] allowing time for the 
employment of other counsel.”80 In Maples, steps to protect the 
client’s interests would include, at a minimum, notifying him of the 
gap in representation and explaining available options going forward. 
Separately, Justice Alito’s opinion identifies the performance of 
Sullivan & Cromwell’s mail room as a distinct contributor to the 
procedural default: “(6) when notice of the decision denying 
petitioner’s request for state postconviction relief was received in 
[the] firm’s offices, the failure of the firm’s mail room to route that 
important communication to either another member of the firm or to 
the departed attorneys’ new addresses.”81 Of course, a mail room is 
not itself a legal person or a morally accountable agent, nor is it a 
naturally-occurring object like a rock formation. Mail rooms have 
operational and supervisory (human) personnel, use technology 
chosen by human personnel, and often operate subject to defined 
protocols or routines. Maples does not address how the error 
happened, but more than one person may have shared responsibility. 
Likewise, the routine or protocol under which the mail room 
operated, or the technology it used, may not have been designed with 
a keen enough eye to the possibility of human error. 
Nonetheless, many breaches of duties by lawyers and 
organizational mishaps within large law firms fall short of the 
standard articulated in Maples to warrant excusing a procedural 
default. How best to define the standard engaged the Court during 
oral argument in Maples. Justice Kagan asked counsel for Maples: 
 
 79.  Id. R. 1.3. It is not clear how compliance with this rule would co-exist with a firm’s 
policy that pro bono clients are those of individual lawyers alone, and are not clients of the firm. 
See supra text accompanying note 47 (describing affidavit from partner of Sullivan & 
Cromwell). 
 80.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d). 
 81.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 928 (Alito, J., concurring). Sounding a much darker note, a 
widely-read blog introduced the term “Mailroom of Death.” See David Lat, Sullivan & 
Cromwell’s Mailroom of Death: A Law Firm’s Error Could Cost a Man His Life, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2010/08/sullivan-cromwells-mailroom-of-
death/; David Lat, Supreme Court Rules on Sullivan & Cromwell’s Mailroom of Death, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/01/supreme-court-rules-on-
sullivan-cromwells-mailroom-of-death/. The term persists. See Staci Zaretsky, Former Sullivan 
& Cromwell ‘Mailroom of Death’ Associate Promoted to Partner at Baker & McKenzie, ABOVE 
THE LAW (July 5, 2012), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/07/former-sullivan-cromwell-
mailroom-of-death-associate-promoted-to-partner-at-baker-mckenzie/. 
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“[H]ow do we distinguish between abandonment and simply a 
botched, a very botched, transfer of responsibility within a law 
firm?”82 Counsel responded: “Well, where you have counsels of record 
leaving without obtaining the approval that they’re required or telling 
the Court, I think that is abandonment pure and simple.”83 Counsel 
continued: “Beyond that, you would look to agency principles, 
whether there’s a breach of loyalty . . . . [Y]ou would want to get into 
the facts, although I think it is a very high bar.”84 As stated in Holland, 
when a lawyer’s breach of duty amounts to abandonment because it 
leaves the client without representation, the lawyer’s conduct is 
external to the client and no longer that of an agent who represents 
the client.85 As counsel for Maples acknowledged, this standard 
demands much of petitioners seeking to excuse procedural defaults. It 
also requires a fact-specific inquiry into events from which the default 
arose.  
III. LIMITING AGENCY’S CONSEQUENCES 
Most broadly, Maples is an invitation to rethink the validity of the 
initial premise that lawyers should be viewed as their clients’ agents 
because this premise carries the consequence, as explained above, that 
absent extraordinary circumstances the client bears the risk of the 
lawyer’s errors. In a recent provocative essay, Adam Liptak questions 
and challenges the appropriateness of the agency framework.86 He 
points out that agency law “is built on the concepts of free choice, 
consent, and loyalty, and it is not unusual to find lawyer-client 
relationships in which some or all of these elements are missing.87 
Putting aside “a sophisticated client with money” who may be 
 
 82.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (2010). 
 86.  See generally Liptak, Agency and Equity, supra note 12. Mr. Liptak is the Supreme 
Court correspondent for the New York Times. 
 87.  Id. at 875. Indeed, agency is defined as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on 
the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). The 
relationship between a lawyer and her client is conventionally defined as an agency relationship. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, ch. 2, intro. note (2000) (stating 
that “[a] lawyer is an agent, to whom clients entrust matters, property, and information, which 
may be of great importance and sensitivity, and whose work is usually not subject to detailed 
client supervision because of its complexity”). A client’s greater vulnerability is the basis on 
which the law creates “safeguards for clients beyond those generally provided to principals.” Id. 
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assumed to exercise free choice among lawyers, monitor the chosen 
lawyer’s work, and terminate representation if the lawyer proves 
inept or disloyal,88 many clients are “poor, uneducated, mentally 
troubled, scared, or imprisoned.”89 For them, the relationship with a 
lawyer may seem less than “authentic,” especially when the lawyer has 
been assigned to the client by the state or is a volunteer, not retained 
counsel.90 
Although agency is often termed a “fiction,”91 like much legal 
doctrine, repetition normalizes agency’s “fictional” elements.92 If a 
fiction, agency seems to operate in an unproblematic fashion in most 
instances. It may even be functionally necessary to understand how 
legal responsibility can be ascribed in many settings, including the 
representation of clients by their lawyers. However, as Maples itself 
illustrates, agency doctrine includes components that limit or defeat 
consequences for the principal that would otherwise follow from the 
conduct of an agent appointed by the principal. Additionally, agency is 
not a body of law with imperial pretensions or imperatives. That is, 
sources of law apart from and external to common-law agency may 
limit its consequences. 
A. Limitations Internal to Agency Doctrine 
Common-law agency is not the only body of common-law 
doctrine with components limiting legal consequences that would 
otherwise follow in their absence. An analogy to contemporary tort 
law may be illuminating. Students learn that the fundamental 
 
 88.  Liptak, Agency and Equity, supra note 12, at 875. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 879. Justice Holmes, for example, wrote of the “fictitious unity of person” as an 
intellectually inexplicable underpinning of agency law. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 
THE COMMON LAW 183 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) (1881). Holmes also characterized 
agency law as the simple-minded combination of a fiction of identity between agent and 
principal, plus common sense. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency II, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1892). 
 92.  As Lon Fuller described the process: 
Probably the maxim “qui facit per alium, facit per se” was originally a fiction because 
it was understood as an invitation to the reader to pretend that the act in question had 
actually been done by the principal in person. But the statement has been so often 
repeated that it now conveys its meaning (that the principal is legally bound by the 
acts of the agent) directly: the pretense that formally intervened between the 
statement and this meaning has been dropped out as a superfluous and wasteful 
intellectual operation. The death of a fiction may indeed be characterized as a result 
of the operation of the law of economy in the field of mental processes. 
LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 19 (1967). 
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structure of liability for general negligence requires that an injured 
person show: (1) a duty owed to him by the injurer; (2) a breach of 
that duty; (3) a factual causal connection between that breach; and (4) 
the loss suffered by the injured party.93 However, tort law contains 
doctrines that limit or defeat liabilities that would otherwise follow 
when the standard four-part analysis is satisfied, even when the 
injurer has no affirmative defense against liability. As is well known, 
even when a defendant’s breach of duty in fact caused injury to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff will lose if the defendant’s breach is not also the 
“proximate” cause of the injury—or, in more contemporary terms, if 
the plaintiff’s injury did not stem from the risk that made the 
defendant’s conduct wrongful.94 Likewise, although the doctrine is less 
crisp, many plaintiffs cannot recover if their injuries consist only of 
economic loss unrelated to any personal injury or injury to property.95 
Tort law thus contains doctrines that spare defendants from liability 
even when a plaintiff establishes the basic requisites for a claim of 
liability in general negligence. 
Similarly, as Maples itself demonstrates, agency doctrine also 
defines boundaries that limit consequences for principals. The 
majority’s analysis turns on the absence of actual authority to act on 
Maples’s behalf by filing a notice of appeal within the limitations 
period. Lawyers may have “represented” Maples in some sense during 
that period and served as his agents, but none (in particular at 
Sullivan & Cromwell) had authority at that time to serve as his lawyer 
in an Alabama court.96 Additionally, agency’s consequences do not 
follow in rote sequence because the parties or popular usage label a 
particular relationship as one of agency.97 Such labels are not 
controlling because “agency” is a legal conclusion made following 
assessment of the facts of a particular relationship.98 Likewise, no 
standard template inherent in the legal category of agency defines the 
 
 93.  See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 
1673 (2007) (stating and criticizing the “standard four-element account of negligence”). 
 94.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 29 (2011). 
 95.  See generally, e.g., Gennady A. Gorel, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for the 
Intermediate Rule and Taming the Tort-Eating Monster, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (2006); Vincent R. 
Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
523 (2009); John J. Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 225. 
 96.  See supra text accompanying notes 42–46. 
 97.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 (2006). 
 98.  Id. cmt. 1.02. 
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scope of an agent’s authority.99 Thus, the fact that a cast of lawyers 
were associated in more-or-less defined ways with the Maples case 
does not mean that each (or any) was authorized to furnish the timely 
assistance Maples required. 
Agency doctrine also limits agency’s consequence by specifying 
when an agency relationship ends. In Maples, for example, the 
relationship ended by abandonment when the two associates left 
Sullivan & Cromwell for jobs elsewhere that prohibited the 
representation of private clients like Maples.100 Additionally, disloyalty 
by an agent may terminate the agency relationship. By definition, 
agency is a fiduciary relationship, long understood to “disallow the 
pursuit of self-interest as a motivating force in actions the agent 
determines to take on the principal’s behalf.”101 It has long been clear 
that an agent breaches this duty by taking a stance “antagonistic” to 
the principal102 because the principal has the right to assume, unless 
informed otherwise, that the agent is able to give the principal “that 
undivided allegiance and loyalty which the proper performance of the 
agency requires and that he will remain in that situation.”103 An 
agent’s serious breach of loyalty thus terminates the agency 
relationship,104 with the consequence (among others) that notice of 
facts known to the agent is not imputed to the principal.105 
In short, just as the Court was able to address Maples’s 
predicament within the framework of agency doctrine, that doctrine 
contains additional components that might be explored to mitigate 
the consequences for clients ill-served by their lawyers. Those 
possibilities are more complex and less direct than the simple 
abandonment and lack of authority theories applied by the majority 
in Maples, and the modest scope of this comment precludes a full 
exploration. 
 
 99.  See id. § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action 
that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with 
the principal’s manifestations, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”). 
 100.  See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 101.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, cmt. b. 
 102.  FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1189 (2d ed. 1914). 
 103.  Id. § 1206. 
 104.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958). 
 105.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04. 
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B. Limitations External to Agency Doctrine 
The factual sequence in Maples suggests another possible limit on 
the consequences of agency. In the sequence of events stated in 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, the blunder in the Sullivan & 
Cromwell mail room was followed by “(7) the failure of the clerk’s 
office to take any action when the envelope[s] containing [the] notice 
came back unopened.”106 Although the majority opinion does not 
analyze the legal consequences of the clerk’s failure, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion emphatically doubts whether “any notice of a court’s order in 
a pending case” is due a litigant.107 His opinion distinguishes the 
litigation context from Jones v. Flowers,108 a 2006 case in which the 
Court held that a state must take additional reasonable steps to locate 
a property owner when a mailed notice of a tax sale is returned 
unclaimed.109 The opinion also emphasizes that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Appellate Procedure do not treat notice as an 
absolute requirement.110 
However, as Adam Litpak argues, it is worth considering whether 
notice should be given directly to the client in cases like Maples—that 
is, cases in which the stakes for the client are high and it confounds 
reality to lump that litigant with a “sophisticated client with money.”111 
To be sure, as Justice Alito’s concurring opinion notes, multi-causal 
misfortunes may also befall clients with retained counsel, but the odds 
of mishap seem higher for litigants like Maples. These are also cases 
in which after-the-fact litigation can be complicated (as in Maples 
itself), and notice to the client of an impending catastrophe may be 
more efficient. Of course, system-wide estimates of relative costs and 
benefits would help. An alternative to imposing a duty to give direct 
notice to a client would be to jettison the basic tenet that agency 
doctrine, with specific modifications, is the appropriate basic 
framework within which to understand attorney-client relationships. 
However, this shift would destabilize much if implemented as a 
general matter. Even limited to cases in which clients resemble Mr. 
 
 106.  Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 928 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 107.  Id. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 108.  547 U.S. 220 (2006). 
 109.  Id. at 220. 
 110.  Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 933 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 77(d)(2) and 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) and 4(a)(6)). 
 111.  Liptak, Agency and Equity, supra note 12, at 875. 
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Maples, discarding agency’s basic framework would require difficult 
exercises in demarcation among lawyer-client relationships and, 
within such relationships, their consequences. Thus, imposing a duty to 
give direct notice to a client under some circumstances seems more 
feasible. The source for the duty would be the equitable nature of the 
doctrine surrounding habeas corpus, such as the principle of equitable 
tolling articulated by the Holland Court.112 
A separate question is how best to specify the trigger for a duty to 
give notice to a client who is represented by counsel, whether 
generally or limited to appointed or pro bono counsel. Potential 
triggers include the nature of the consequences about to befall the 
client,113 the type of case, and whether a lawyer bore relatively greater 
responsibility for an impending default than did the client. As Mr. 
Liptak notes, Justice Black’s dissent in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.114 
in 1962 argued that as a general rule: 
[I]t would be far better in the interest of the administration of 
justice, and far more realistic in the light of what the relationship 
between a lawyer and his client actually is, to adopt the rule that 
no client is ever to be penalized . . . because of the conduct of his 
lawyer unless notice is given to the client himself that such a threat 
hangs over his head.115 
In contrast, the four-to-three majority opinion in Link, a civil case 
dismissed when a lawyer did not prosecute it diligently, held that 
having freely chosen his (retained) counsel, the client was charged 
with the consequences of his chosen agent’s conduct.116 “Any other 
notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative 
litigation,” wrote Justice Harlan.117 Again, some system-wide 
assessment of costs and consequences, taking into account 
developments in the fifty years since 1962, would be useful. 
 
 
 112.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 113.  For an example, see Dunphy v. McKee, 134 F.3d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that, although no “ironclad” requirement dictates notice to a client of impending dismissal of his 
case as a result of a lawyer’s omissions or errors, regardless of whether counsel is retained or 
appointed by court, the district court has the power to notify the client and “should weigh the 
extent to which the responsibility for the neglect of the case lay with the lawyer rather than the 
client” as well as consider “penalizing the lawyer rather than the client”). 
 114.  370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
 115.  Id. at 648 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 116.  Id. at 633–44 (majority opinion). 
 117.  Id. 
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Finally, and circling back to agency doctrine for an analogy, the 
facts of Maples suggest a distinct trigger for a duty to give notice 
directly to a represented client: the State’s awareness of facts from 
which it may reasonably be inferred that the client’s lawyers no longer 
effectively represent him. As discussed above, at some point the 
Assistant Attorney General who represented the State in Maples’s 
post-conviction proceedings appears to have reached that 
conclusion.118 Separately, the court clerk’s receipt of the “Return to 
Sender” envelopes at a minimum gave notice that something might be 
seriously awry in the representation of Maples, particularly if the 
court knew that local counsel in such cases served only to obtain pro 
hac vice admission for out-of-state pro bono counsel.  
Apparent authority is a long-established basis in agency doctrine 
on which a principal may be charged with the legal consequences of 
an agent’s actions even though the agent lacks actual authority to take 
such action on the principal’s behalf.119 Whether an agent acts with 
apparent authority turns on whether the third party with whom the 
agent interacts reasonably believes the agent to act with actual 
authority and whether that belief is traceable to a manifestation by 
the principal.120 When a third party’s belief is unreasonable, the 
principal is not bound on the basis of apparent authority.121 In Maples, 
the re-appearance of the notices sent to Maples’s out-of-state counsel 
marked “Return to Sender” could call into question whether, without 
further inquiry, it was reasonable for the clerk to continue to believe 
that those lawyers continued to represent Maples. Circumstances that 
challenge the reasonableness of continuing to believe that a particular 
lawyer effectively provides representation to a client might also 
trigger a duty to notify the client directly. Although this duty does not 
stem from agency doctrine itself, the extensive body of cases 
determining whether an agent acted with apparent authority may 
help clarify when agents of the state, like the trial court clerk and the 
Assistant Attorney General in Maples, could not reasonably believe 
that a client’s counsel of record continued to represent that client.   
 
 118.  See supra text accompanying notes 63–69. 
 119.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id.; id. § 3.03. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The majority’s opinion in Maples is narrowly drawn to resolve the 
immediate petitioner’s misfortune with a close focus on the facts that 
led to his predicament. The opinion, building on the framework 
articulated in Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Holland v. Florida, 
locates bases within agency doctrine itself to excuse a client from the 
consequences of flawed legal representation. Additionally, the case 
should serve as a cautionary landmark, illustrating that a sequence of 
errors can lead to grave consequences. The case’s broadest 
significance may well be pedagogical, emphasizing to lawyers (and 
law students) the responsibility due clients from individual lawyers 
and the firms through which they practice law. 
 
